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A zero-sum differential game of infinite horizon is considered. Positive switching 
costs are associated with each player. We prove that under a condition, which is 
different from the Isaacs’ condition, the Elliot-Kalton value of the game always 
exists. The value is the unique viscosity solution of corresponding Isaacs’ type 
system of equations, which appears to be a system of quasi-variational inequalities 
with bilateral obstacles. The discussion of the case that the switching costs 
approach to zero shows that the Isaac? condition still has to be assumed to 
guarantee that the limit of the values corresponding to positive switching costs 
converge to the value corresponding to zero switching costs-the classical 
Elliot-Kalton value of the game. 4“ 1990 Academrc Press, Inc 
1. INTR00ucTl0~ 
In this paper, we consider a differential game governed by the following: 
i 
jr(t) =gb.x(t)~ 4th Ht)), t > 0, 
Y,(O) =x3 (1.1) 
with the payoff functional 
J?‘(4.), H.1) = SE fMt), 4th h(t))e- ” dt 
0 
+ C k(aimm ,, a,)e-""-- C f(b,-, , h,)ec"'I, (1.2) 
ia 1 121 
where k( ., .) and I( ., .) are some given positive functions called switching 
costs. In the above game, player I chooses control 
a(‘)= C ai-lXIO,-,,O,)(.) 
i: I 
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from some set .d” (see Section 2 for definition) to minimize ( 1.2) while 
player II chooses control 
ht.)= c b, lXfr, ,.;J~) 
i’ 1 
from some set ,gh (see Section 2 also) to maximize (1.2). 
The problem is different from the classical one in that we have positive 
switching costs associated with each player. For example, player I starts 
with control value ug at t =O. Suppose at t = 8,, he decides to switch 
his control value from L+, to a,. To achieve this, he has to pay 
k(a,, a,)e -~it’E > 0. 
Due to the appearance of the (positive) switching costs, the problem 
becomes complicated. We adopt the notion of strategies from Elliot and 
Kalton [9] (see [ 1 I] also). We obtain in Section 3 the dynamic program- 
ming principle for the lower and the upper Elliot-Kalton value functions. 
Then, we formally derive the Isaacs’ type system of equations for these 
value functions. The system appears to be a system of quasi-variational 
inequalities with bilateral obstacles. In Section 4, we prove that the lower 
and upper value functions of the game are viscosity solutions of the same 
Isaacs’ system. Then, by assuming a technical condition (G4) (which is 
suggested by [21, 221) we prove that the Isaacs’ system has at most one 
viscosity solution. Hence, we obtain the existence of the value of the game. 
It is interesting that in the above investigation, we do not assume the usual 
Isaac? condition. The explanation should be the appearance of the positive 
switching costs and the mentioned technical condition (G4). Finally, in 
Section 6 we show that if the switching costs approach to zero, the corre- 
sponding value functions have convergent subsequences. Any limit of them 
is a viscosity sub-solution of the upper Isaacs’ equation and a viscosity 
super-solution of the lower Isaacs’ equation. Hence, in the case where 
Isaacs’ condition holds, we have that the value functions corresponding to 
positive switching costs converge to the unique viscosity solution of the 
Isaacs’ equation, which is nothing but the (classical) ElliottKalton value 
function of the game with finitely-valued controls. 
Differential games have been discussed by many authors. Various defini- 
tions of strategies and values were introduced (see [4, 9, 12, 13, 151). We 
also mention some works related to this paper [ 1, 5, 11, 171. It seems 
possible to obtain the similar results of this paper by adopting some other 
definitions of strategies, especially that in [4]. But it is not clear if we can 
use that of [ 15). For some other related switching problems, we refer the 
readers to [2, 6, 10, 16, 19, 201. To close the introduction, we should point 
out that by using the techniques introduced in [23], we are able to discuss 
differential games with switching and impulse controls. We will carry out 
the full details of these elsewhere. For the games governed by stochastic 
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ODE with impulse controls we mention the work by Bensoussan and 
Lions [3]. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
Let A = { 1, 2, . . . . m }, B = { 1, 2, . . . . IZ} and let X be a finite dimensional 
Euclidean space. Let g:XxAxB+X, f:XxAxB-+R, k:AxA+R+, 
I: B x B + R + be continuous functions satisfying the following conditions: 
(Gl) There exist L>O, O-CC?< 1, such that for all .x,~EX, 
(a, b) E A x B, 
Ig(x, a, h)-g(i, a, h)l <L Ix-~~l, 
I g(x, 6 b)l 6 L, 
If(x, a, h)-f(i-, 4 h)l <L Ix-.q”, 
If(x, 4 h)l G L. 
(G2) For all u,ci,HEA, u#ii#ii, 
k(u, ii) < k(u, 6) + k(ci, cl), 
k(u, 6) > 0, k(u, a) = 0. 
(G3) For all b, 6, 6 E B, b # 6 # 6, 
I(b, 8) < I(b, h) + f(6, 6), 
I(b, 6) > 0, 1(b, b) = 0. 
We should note that all the above assumptions can be slightly relaxed. 
For example, we may let g be of linear growth and f be of some power 
growth. In this case, we might use some techniques of [ 141 in Section 4. 
Next, for E. > 0, a E A, b E B, we define the following control sets: 
d”= a(.)= c u,~,~cn,~,,o,,(~):[O,+co)~AIu,=u,8,=0,~iE[O,+cO], i i>l 
V~~1;8,~+co,u,+,#u,,ifB,+,<co; 1 k(u,-,,u,)e~i.H~-cm 
i2 I I 
.ciTb= b(.)= C bi~,XCr,_,.r,,(.):CO, +mbBIb,=b,~,=O,~,~ I3 +a]> 
j2 1 
\y’j~1;51f+00,bj+,#b.i,ift,+,<co; c I(b,p,,bj)ep”“<cc . 
i2 I 
The following definition is adopted from [9] (see [ll] also). 
409’145 2-I? 
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DEFINITION 2.1. For given m E A (resp. h E B), an admissible strategy 
c(” (resp. /V) for player I (resp. II) is a mapping CC’: Uhc H dh + ,d” 
(resp. 8”: IJot A s!” + .W”), such that 
h(t)=&) (resp. u(t) = ci( t)), Vt E [O, s], 
implies 
cc”Cb(.)l(t)=cr”CI;(.)l(t) (rev. B’Ca(.)l(t)=S”[ci(.)l(t)), vfe [o,~l. 
We denote all admissible strategies for player I (resp. II) by f” (resp. A”). 
Then, we define 
V”.‘(x) = inf s ZEP, hl,~~~~hJ:.h(aCh(.)l,h(.)), 
U’,“(x)= sup inf J;h(~(.),/l[~(.)]). 
,{ E Jb 0, ) t .d” 
We call the (m x n)-matrix valued functions V( .) and U( .) lower and upper 
(Elliot-Kalton) value functions of our differential game, respectively 
(cf. [9, 111). 
Now, let us give some basic properties of the lower and upper value 
functions. 
LEMMA 2.2. For any (a, h) E A x B, x, i E X, 
I v”~h(x)I, I u”w 6 $ (2.1) 
I V”.“(x) -- vqi)l, I UUJyx) - - c.Pb(i)l < & Ix-iI”, (2.2) 
where O<?/<min{6,A/L}. 
The proof is similar to those given in 161. However, we should point out 
that if we defined the strategies of feedback type, then it is not clear 
whether we still have (2.2). 
3. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING 
In this section we use the Bellman Dynamic Programming Principle to 
explore some properties of our lower and upper value functions. For 
convenience, let us concentrate on the lower value function V( .) first. 
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THEOREM 3.1. The function V( .) .satisfies the following optimality 
principle: For all (a, b, x) E A x B x X, t > 0, 
V”‘(X) = inf sup ‘f(yAs), dIb(.)l(s), bb))ep’“ds 
cfep h(.)td+ 
+ c k(ai.. ,, a,)e- “I- c l(b,- ,, b,)e-“‘1 
8, s r ‘, 6 1 
+ v?Cb(.))l(r).b(r)(y~(t))e~j.I 
1 
, (3.1) 
where {a,, ei} and {b,, Eli> are associated with ol[b( .)] and b( .), respectively, 
andcc[b(.)](t)=a[b(.)](t+O), b(t)=b(t+O) andy,(t)=y,(t+O). 
The proof is basically the same as that given in [ 111. Let us just sketch 
the proof. 
Sketch of the proof: We let w(x) be the right hand side of (3.1). For any 
E > 0, there exists an a0 E P, such that 
w(x) + E > ‘f(v,(s), ~oCb(~)l(s), b(s)W’” ds 
(3.2) 
Also, we have E = k(y,(t), cr,[b( .)1(t), b(t)) E P°Cb(.)3(‘), such that 
vzoCb(. )I(‘)Jq y,( t)) + E > sup J~~p:.)‘(‘),b(‘)(,[6( .)I, %( .)). (3.3) 
X( , E d*(‘) 
Then, we define 6 E r” as follows: For any b( .) E UbsB gb, 
~Cb(.)l(s) = ~o[b(.)lb) 
if s<t 
:[b(t + .)](s - t) if s > t. 
Then, under this strategy, by some routine calculation, we have 
sup J:b(oi[b( .)I, b( .)) Q w(x) + 2~. 
b(.)e& 
Hence, it follows that 
Pb(X) < w(x). 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
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Conversely, for any E > 0, we have an x, E I‘“, such that 
V”.h(x)+c3 sup J’;,h(r,[h(.)].h(.)). 
h( IF.& 
By the definition of w(x), we have a h,( .)EJ$~, such that 
(3.6) 
Then, for any 6( .) E !%‘l(‘), we define 
6(s) = 
b,(s), s6 t; 
i;(s - t), s > t. 
We define oi E PChl(‘)l(‘) as follows: 
(3.9) oiCi;(.)l(s)=a,Cfi(.)l(s+t), SbO 
for all a( .) 6 g”t’) and h( .) defined as above. For this c& we have 
V~IChl(-)l(r),bllr)(yi(f)) < sup 
7i( ) t Jhll” 
,::ltP,,(.)‘(f),b”“(tica( .)I, h(’ )). 
Hence, there exists a i;,( .) E 49’l(‘), such that (we define g,(.) as in (3.8) 
taking &.)=J,(.)) 
V311Cbl(.)l(‘),hl(t)(lii(t)) - E <~~~~~,“.‘l”‘.bl”‘(~[~,(. j-j, g,(. 1). 
(3.8) 
Then, an easy calculation (noting (3.7)) gives 
Letting E + 0, and combining (3.5), we obtain the desired conclusion. 1 
Next, let us define the following obstacle. For any (m x n) matrix valued 
function W( .) = ( IV”-“( .)), 
A4’,‘[ W](x) = min { IJV”,~(X) +k(a, Cz)}, 
O#B 
Mrr,h[W](x)= 'lr,": { WU,h(~)- 1(b, 6)}. 
Now we apply Theorem 3.1 to obtain some more interesting properties 
for the lower value function. 
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THEOREM 3.2. The lower value function V( .) satisfies the following: 
(i) For any (a,b,x)EAxBxX, 
Mo,b[ V](x) < va,b(x) < kPb[ V](x), 
(ii) Suppose that at (a, b, x) E A x B x X, 
Pb(X) < kPb[ V](x). 
Then, there exists a t,>O, such that 
VU*“(x)>/if(yX(s), a, b)C”“ds+ V”~“(y.,(t))eC”‘, 
(iii) Suppose that at (a, b, X)EA x Bx X, 
V”,“(x) > lwb[ V](x). 
Then, there exists a t, > 0, such that 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
tE [0, to]. (3.12) 
(3.13) 
t E [O, to]. (3.14) 
Proof. The proof of (i) is very similar to that given in [6]. Now, let us 
prove (ii). For any t, E > 0 and b( .) = b E B, by Theorem 3.1, there exists an 
CX~ E r”, such that 
P”(X) + 8 3 s ’ f(y,(s), ui[b], b)e-“” ds 0 
+ C k(ay<,, a:x’)eC”‘f’+ VzjCb3C’1,b(y.~(t))e~ir, (3.15) 
(I”.’ <r , . 
where ~:[6](.)=C;,r al“,Xce~~,,e~,(.)E~u. We claim that for all small 
E, t > 0, 
ey > t. (3.16) 
Suppose it is not the case, i.e., there exists a sequence (E, t) -+ (0, 0), such 
that 
ey < t. (3.17) 
Then, for this sequence, taking limits in (3.15), we have 
Pb(X) b hPb[ V](x), 
462 JIONGMIN YONG 
which contradicts (3.11). Hence, (3.16) holds and then, (3.15) becomes 
vq~) + E 3 *’ f’(JJS), a, b)e ” ds + vql.,(r))e jr, J 0‘ 
(3.18) 
for all small E, t > 0. Thus, fix a small t > 0 and let c -+ 0, we obtain (3.12). 
Next, let us show (iii). Let 
~IJC~(~)l(s) = 4 Qb(.)d?‘, ~30. 
Then, by (3.1), we know that for this x0 and any E, t > 0 there exists a 
bi( .) E gb, such that 
V”“(x) - E 6 j’ ,f( y,(s), a, b:(s))e ” ds 
0 
(E, l(b;‘,, b;“)ed’+ Ph”“‘(yX(t))e- j.‘. (3.19) 
> ’ 
Here, b:( .) = Ci, r bf’f , xcr;.! ,r;.~j( .), We again argue as above to get 
T’i.‘> f. (3.20) 
Then, our conclusion follows. 1 
The following result is obvious. 
COROLLARY 3.3. Zf at (a, 6, x) E A x B x X, 
Mrr.J V](x) < P”(x) < Mq V](x), (3.21) 
then, there exists t,>O, such that 
~‘~~(x)=~~f(y.~(s), a, b)e-“” cl’s+ Ph(y,(t))e “, Qt E [0, to]. (3.22) 
The next result gives the Isaacs’ system of equations for the lower value 
function. For convenience, we set 
f+‘(x, P) = (P, g(x, a, 6)) +f(x> a, b). (3.23) 
THEOREM 3.4. Suppose Vh( .) E C’. Then it satisfies the following 
Isaac? sys tern : 
min{max{/2V”~h(x) - IP’(x, DV”,‘(x)), Pb(x)- Ma.‘[ V](x)}, 
Va’b(x) - hf,,,[ v](x)} = 0 (a,b,x)EAxBxX, 
(3,24) 
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and 
max { min 
Pb(X) - 
{ wqx) - wqx, Dwyx)), v’qx) - Mu,J V](x)}, 
My V](x)) =0 (a, b, x) E A x B x X. 
(3 25) 
The proof is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 3.2. 
Symmetrically, we have the following result for the upper value function: 
THEOREM 3.5. The function U( .) satisfies the following optimality 
principle: For all (a, b, x) E A x B x X, t > 0, 
uy x) = sup inf 
/j$=dh U(.)E.d” I 
‘f(y.$), a(s), BC4.)lb)Wi”ds 0 
+ C k(a,-,,a,)e-““I- C /(bi-,,b,)e~“‘i 
0, s f r, G r 
+ Uu(f),(PCo(-)l(r)(y.l(t))e~j.l , (3.1)’ 
where {ai, ei} and {b,, zi} are associated with a( .) and B[a( .)I, respec- 
tively, and a(t)=a(t+O), ~[a(.)](t)=B[a(.)](t+O) and y,Y(t)=y,(t+O). 
Remark 3.6. It is important to know that by the above theorem, the 
same result as Theorem 3.2 (therefore the same result as Theorem 3.4) 
holds for the upper value function U( .). Hence, if (3.24) or (3.25) has at 
most one C’ solution and U(.) and V( .) are C’, then, U( .) = V( .), i.e., the 
game has a value. 
4. VISCOSITY SOLUTIONS 
Since the lower and upper value functions are not necessarily C’, they 
are not classical solutions of (3.24) or (3.25). Thus, we need the notion of 
viscosity solutions introduced by Crandall and Lions [8] (see [ 1, 5, 7, 11, 
221 also). We let BUC(X; lJYx”) be the set of all bounded, uniformly 
continuous (m x n) matrix valued functions defined on X. 
DEFINITION 4.1. Function W( . ) E BUC(X; R” x “) is called a viscosity 
sub-solution (resp. super-solution) of (3.24), if for any C’ function d( .), 
whenever I+‘&“( .) - d( .) attains a local maximum (resp. minimum) at 
xoeX, one has 
min{max{~W”~b(x,) - Ph(xO, DIPb(x,)), WU~b(~,)-Ma~b[ W](x,)}, 
~“%G) - Mo,bC WhJ)~ G 0 (resp. B 0). (4.1) 
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If W( .) is both a viscosity sub- and super-solution of (3.24) then it is 
called a viscosity solution of (3.24). 
We can stmiiarly define the viscosity sub-solutions, super-solutions, and 
solutions for (3.25). From 17, 81, we know that in the above delinition, the 
local maximum (resp. minimum) can be replaced by strict local maximum 
(resp. minimum). 
By directly applying Theorem 3.2 and Remark 3.5, we can easily prove 
the following. 
THEOREM 4.2. The lower vulue function V( .) and the upper value function 
.!I(. ) are viscosity solutions qf (3.24). 
Then, we come up with a very important result of this paper, namely, the 
uniqueness of the viscosity solution of (3.24), which will give the existence 
of the value of our differential game. Before proving this result, let us first 
give the following lemma, which can be proved in a similar manner as [6]. 
LEMMA 4.3. Suppse W( .) is a viscosity solution qf(3.24). Then, 
Mu,hC WI(x) d W%) d MUxh[ WI(x), V(a, h, x) E A x B x A’. (4.2) 
Now, we are ready to state the following: 
THEOREM 4.4. Suppose (Gl )-( G3) and the Jo//owing (G4) hold: 
(G4) For uny,finite loop {(a,, hi)}/=, c A x B, 
.* 
f: ha,, u (+ ,j’- i: I(~,,~,+,)zo, 
t=I ,= I 
(4.3) 
where ai+, =u,, h,,, =h,. 
Then, for any two viscosity solutions W( ) and I&‘( .) of (3.24), we have 
W( ) = I+(. ). 
ProojI Let 
K2 SUP II Wx)ll, SUP II Wx)ll. 
VEX YE x 
Let y( .): X -+ [0, 1 ] be such that 
i 
Y(O) = 1, Y(X) < 1 if s#O, 
Y(X) = 0, if Ix1 3 1, IIDy(x d C, VXEX. 
For any E > 0, set y,(x) = y(x/~). Define 
@““(x, y) = W’,“(x) - l@“(y) + 3Ky,(x-y). (4.4) 
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Then, we can find x0, y, E X, such that 
sup mah” Wh(X, y) 6 m;x Ph(XO, y,) + E. 
r,.t ’ 
Then, we let (T(., .):XxX+ [0, l] be such that 
i 
o(0, 0) = 1, a(x, y) < 1 if t-u, Y) Z (0, 01, 
a(x, y) = 0 if lx12+ly1231, 
II~\-dT IID~all d c. 
(4.5) 
Define 
vqx, y) = CDqx, I’) + 2ca(x - xg, y-y,,). (4.6) 
Then, arguing as in [6], we can find -to, j,,~ X with I.&-x,12 + 
Ijo-y012<l, such that for some (a,,6,)~AxB, one has 
!P~h~(.i-,, PO) = sup my Vh(x, y). (4.7) 
1. F 0. 
Thus, by the definition of viscosity solution, we have 
min{max{~W”l~hl(~.O)-Hu~~h’(~O, -3KDy,(~~i-,-il,)-2&D.a(l,-x,,~,-y,)), 
W’qi”) - M”l.bl[ W](i,)}, w’yi”) - Ma,,h,[ w](a,,)} 60, 
(4.8) 
and 
min{max{l~L~b1(3,)-Hu’I~hl(~0,-33KDy,(f,-P,)+2ED,.o(,~,-x,,~,-y,)), 
~1.b1(30)-M”l,bl[~](~0)}, ~.“1(3”)-M,,,,,[~](pl}~o. 
(4.9) 
Now, let us assume that 
and 
w”““‘(&,) - Mu,,,,,[ ~](‘+,)>“, (4.10) 
IP’yjq - lwlJl[ Fv](&) < 0. (4.11) 
Then, applying exactly the same argument as in [6], we can obtain for any 
xEXtixed and any (a,h)~AxB, 
lvqx) - F+“(x) Q Wa’yi-,) - bw(j,) + 3K(y,& -p(J - 1) + 2E 
<o(l) as E -0. 
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Hence, by symmetry, we obtain the desired conclusion. In case (4.1 I) or 
(4.12) does not hold, we can use an argument similar to that of [6] or 
[22] combined with (G4) to get an index (u,, h,) E A x B for which (4.7) 
(4.11), and (4.12) hold. From this our conclusion follows. 1 
We should note that the above proof is very similar to those given in 
[6]. We can prove the same result for system (3.25). From Theorems 3.4, 
4.4, and Remark 3.6, we can obtain the following 
THEOREM 4.5. Let (Gl)--(G4) hold. Then the Elliot-Kalton v&e qf our 
diiferentiuf game ( 1 .l ))( 1.2) exists. 
5. LIMITING CASE 
In this section, we study the situation when the switching costs k( ., .) 
and I( ., .) approach zero. We let k,( ., .) and I,( ., .) be two sequences of 
switching costs for players I and II, which go to zero as E goes to zero. Let 
us assume (Gl )-(G3) hold and let I’,( .) be the lower value function corres- 
ponding to pair (k,( ., .), I,:( ., .)). Then, by (2.1) and (2.2), we see that the 
family { I’:“( .) 1 (a, h) E A x B, E > 0) is uniformly bounded and equicon- 
tinuous. Thus, by Arzela-Ascoli Theorem, there exists a subsequence, such 
that 
Vyyx) + W”Jyx) as c -+O, (5.1) 
uniformly for x in compact sets. It is clear that IPh( .) also satisfies (2.1) 
and (2.2). 
We will explore further properties of IP”( .). For later convenience, let 
us define 
H+(x, p)=3fEi; ‘Ir,a,x {<P, gk 6 h)) +.f(x, a, h)l, (5.2) 
H (x, p) = y-y; 2: { (p, g(x, 0, h)) +.f(& 0, h)}. (5.3) 
Now, we may state and prove the main result of this section. 
THEOREM 5.1. For the functions { W“xh( .)I (a, h)~ A x B}, we have the 
following conclusions: 
(i) There exists a function w( .) satisfying (2.1) and (2.2), such that 
IPh(X) = w(x), t’(a,h,x)~AxBxX. (5.4) 
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(ii) Function w( .) is a viscosity sub-solution of the upper Isaacs 
equation 
lw(x) - II+ (x, h(x)) = 0. (5.5) 
(iii) Function w( .) is a viscosity super-solution of the lower Isaacs 
equation 
Iw(x) - H-(x, Lqx)) = 0. (5.5)’ 
ProoJ: (i) Since 
Mo,bC VAX) 6 y%) 6 M”“C V,l(x), 
thus, by taking limits in the above, we can easily get (i). 
(ii) For any #( .)E C’(X) with w( .)-d( .) attains a strict local 
maximum at X~E X. Then, for any aE A, by the local uniformality of the 
convergence (5.1), we have x, -+ x,,, such that 
yf; V;‘(xE) - 4(x,) > yEa; V%“(x) -d(x) for xnear x,. (5.6) 
We let b; E B, such that 
VfbF(xE) = mEa; V;“(X~). (5.7) 
Thus, noting that for any bE B\{bz}, I(bF, b)>O, we have 
v:b’(xc) ’ M,,b;[ V~l(X~:). (5.8) 
On the other hand, by the definition of viscosity solutions and (5.8), we 
have 
ipbqX) - I-Pb~(X,, Dfqx,)) < 0. (5.9) 
Then, by choosing a subsequence if necessary, and taking the limits, we 
obtain 
%w(x,) - NU’6(Xo. Dqqx,)) 6 0, 
for some 5 E: B (depending on a). Thus, 
ysa; FE$ (Wh) - ffa,b(xo, W6-d)) d 0, 
i.e., 
(5.10) 
(5.11) 
iw(x,) - H+(x,, D&c,)) d 0. 
This proves (ii). The proof of (iii) is similar. 1 
(5.12) 
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Next, we have the following: 
COROLLARY 5.2. Let the Isaucs’ condition hold: 
ff+tx, P) = H t.5 p) f H(x, p), V(x, P)EXXX. (5.13) 
Then, for any (a, h) E A x B, 
lim V;:h(~) = TV, (5.14) 
c -0 
uniformly for x in any compact sets, where w( .) is the unique viscosity 
solution of 
/h(x) - H(x, Dw(x)) = 0. (5.15) 
Proof By Theorem 5.1 and (5.13) we se that w( ) defined by (5.4) is a 
viscosity solution of (5.15). Then by the uniqueness of viscosity solutions of 
Eq. (5.15), we have that the whole sequence { P’f”(. ) f is convergent. u 
It is not hard to see that u$ .) obtained in (5.14) is exactly the 
Elliot-Kalton value function of the classical two-player zero-sum differen- 
tial game of fixed duration with control sets A and B. We also see that we 
have the same result as Corollary 5.2 for the upper value functions U:“(. ). 
Finally, as far as the above convergence is concerned, the condition (G4) 
is irrelevant. 
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